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Lindsay Tanner’s book Open Australia, published in February 1999, and 
embraced with much fanfare in the media, especially by pro-business 
commentators, represents a disturbing departure from the policies of the Left 
and from the kinds of policies now needed to advance the interests of 
Australian workers.   
 
The effective argument of this book is that globalisation is happening to such 
an extent and so inevitably that unions and Labor governments must abandon 
their traditional aspirations to substantially moderate and restrain the 
inequalities and injustices which the free market generates – and, moreover, 
move away from a class based approach.  Government must play a much 
weaker role than in the past – be a mere “facilitator” to make the market 
economy more efficient.  To facilitate means to make easier.  The question 
which Tanner’s analysis unfortunately begs is: what should government make 
easier?  Should they for instance make it easier for employers to exploit 
workers, or easier for workers to protect, improve and better control their 
wages, hours and other working conditions?  
 
The following passage from the book in relation to industrial relations is typical 
of the book’s general tone that because change is happening we must largely 
surrender to it, rather than fundamentally intervene in and shape it. Tanner 
writes (at pages 139-140) that  
 
Australia’s traditional industrial relations system is beginning to unravel.  
Within little more than a decade we have moved from a fully centralised 
system of comprehensive awards prescribing most terms and 
conditions of employment to a world of enterprise bargaining, individual 
contracts and simplified awards performing a largely residual role. 
 
As union officials often point out, some of these changes occurred 
under a Labor government.  Yet although this agenda of deregulation 
and decentralisation has clearly been influenced by right-wing 
ideological imperatives, it is largely a response to the impact of 
technological change and the new economy. 
 
The Australian award system in the 1980s reflected the workplace and 
production process of the 1950s…In the one-dimensional world of the 
industrial age, this comprehensive prescription was sustainable.  Now 
the diversity, flexibility and changing skill requirements of the new 
economy are undermining the award system. 
 
In response, he only wants “to sustain the safety net function of the award 
system” (p 141; my italics) and pays mere lip service to the goal of “sustaining 
an industrial relations system which reduces inequality and prevents 
exploitation” (p 142). 
 
Technological determinism  
 
In his version of the changes that have taken place in industrial relations, as in 
so many other areas, Tanner attributes a great deal to technological change.  
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For example:  “globalisation is an essentially unavoidable reality driven by 
pervasive technological change” (p 12); the “apparent loss of regulatory power 
by national government is primarily driven by technological change” (p 93); 
“technological change has made the price for crude subjugation of the market 
too high"(p 55).  He uses the obvious fact that many new technologies have 
emerged as a pretext to abandon all sorts of fundamental political goals.   
 
Is it really technological change which is driving de-industrialisation and 
closures e.g. of Gloweave (pages 88-90)?  The Textile, Clothing and 
Footwear (TCF) Union says drastic tariff reduction was the crucial factor in 
that closure and challenges Tanner’s other assertions that “the threat of 
cheap labour undermining western living standards is exaggerated” (p 89) and 
that “cheap foreign labour is not quite the threat to Australian jobs that it is 
made out to be” (p 90).  The rapid growth in the numbers (now estimated at 
300 000) of garment outworkers inside Australia using very basic technology 
due to the much lower wages they can be paid in our newly “flexible” labour 
market is absent from Tanner’s analysis. The extent of the accuracy of his 
broader claim that “many of the manufacturing jobs lost in the eighties were 
destroyed by technological change, not tariff cuts” (p 110) would also be 
queried by many other unions. 
 
Were the Hawke and Keating governments’ policy decisions in the 1980s 
really “driven in the most part by technological and structural change” (p 103) 
as he claims?  The constant parading throughout the book of examples of the 
dazzling array of changes and new gadgets emerging with the spread of 
information technology tends to distract from some more fundamental 
features about the context of their introduction and application.  
 
Tanner acknowledges that to some extent the “agenda of deregulation and 
decentralisation has…been influenced by right-wing ideological imperatives” 
but tries to play down the extent to which it has been a politically driven 
strategy reflecting the dominance of New Right or neo-liberal ideas and to 
play up the view that it is the natural course of economic evolution.  Tanner 
follows and endorses the line of senior Australian newspaper journalist Paul 
Kelly, and right-wing New South Wales union officials Michael Costa and 
Mark Duffy, that the policy changes of the 1980s were inevitable responses to 
external events and influences. 
 
Tanner regularly refers to the industrial world disappearing (e.g. “as the 
industrial world fades”, p 98), overlooking the crucial fact that while the nature 
of the work has changed the new areas of work are also themselves 
“industries” (as he himself elsewhere refers to them), the unequal class 
relationships of industrialism are essentially still there and therefore the past 
Labor and Left goals of making these relationships more equal – even though 
they were pursued in the past – remain acutely relevant. 
 
Tanner says that “Labor requires a new…philosophy which is universal rather 
than class-based” (p 98).  Should class, albeit in changed forms and 
identities, really no longer form the basis of our philosophy given that the most 
disadvantaged members of society need a special voice and extra attention 
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which will be lost in an amorphous “universal” approach?  The fact that the 
manual or blue-collar working class has long been shrinking in relative size 
does not mean the end of the need for a class approach, as the white-collar 
working class in clerical, sales and services jobs has been rising at the same 
time. 
 
Industrial relations 
 
Tanner also uses the word “flexibility” without identifying who the flexibility is 
for.  He apparently believes that “part-time, casual and temporary employment 
have flourished, partly in response to greater needs of flexibility in the 
production process, partly reflecting employer and employee demand, and 
partly in response to the needs of a massively increased number of post-
secondary students” (pages 118-119).  He makes no mention of the fact that 
the particularly rapid explosion of casual employment in Australia in the last 
decade (it has doubled to 26 per cent of all employment, giving Australia the 
highest rate of casual employment in the OECD behind Spain) is because 
labour market deregulation has occurred, and that it reflects the increased 
power of employers to impose precarious employment on workers, which 
suits the employers’ needs but is hurting workers.  
 
It is in the name of “flexibility” that employers have used their growing power 
in the less regulated labour market to impose excessive, unpredictable and 
increasingly unpaid working hours on employees.  Yet Tanner continues to 
misrepresent and attack in an extraordinarily prominent way the genuine and 
energetic attempts by many on the Left and the huge effort now being put in 
by numerous unions to tackle the growing unfair distribution of, and stress at, 
work as one element of a multi-faceted strategy to tackle unemployment and 
unfair industrial relations.  He ignores the mounting evidence that the problem 
of increased and unpaid overtime is far more widespread than among 
managers and professionals (see for example Australian Centre for Industrial Relations 
Research and Teaching, Australia at Work, Prentice Hall, 1999, p 111) and continues to 
criticise the idea of a “mandated reduction in working hours” (p 120) even 
though this was never in fact advocated by those in the ALP who successfully 
sought inclusion in the new 1998 platform of a variety of more sophisticated 
measures for a fairer distribution of work. 
 
Contradictions in economic policy 
 
There are some fundamental contradictions in Tanner’s approach to 
economic policy.  He says he supports the strengthening of public sector 
employment in depressed regions, and parts of the book profess support for 
greater public investment in infrastructure (esp. pages 129-133) and more 
resources for schools (Chapter 5) but Tanner is elsewhere unwilling to face up 
to and act for the fiscal outlays that such commitments actually require.  He 
has for instance argued against some of the most important measures which 
are actually needed to tackle unemployment, declaring that: 
 
Previously useful mechanisms such as monetary and fiscal policy now 
have limited impact because of internationalisation.  Unduly low 
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interest rates are likely to diminish saving and provoke a capital flight.  
High budget deficits will tend to produce similar effects” (“Populism and 
Rationalism”, May 1997, pages 1-2.)  
 
What principal economic policy instruments then are we left with?  Despair? 
 
Industry policy 
 
After noting that “between 1988 and 1996 Australia’s trade-weighted average 
tariff fell from 19 per cent to 5 per cent”, Tanner asserts that “contrary to 
popular mythology, similar reductions have occurred in most of our Asian 
neighbours over this period” (p 66).  (His documented source for this assertion is a 
Ross Gittins newspaper article, “Tariff Myths Down for the Count”, Age, 18 September 1997.)  
Hidden in the book’s endnote is an acknowledgement that “administrative and 
other non-tariff barriers are still common in our Asian neighbours”.   
 
Even on the figures Gittins uses, however, the overall trade weighted tariff in 
China stands at nearly four times the level of Australia’s.  Tim Colebatch, The 
Age Economics Editor, has consistently and meticulously documented how 
Australia unilaterally reduced tariffs at a much more rapid pace than other 
nations in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the dislocation which this caused, 
particularly in the area of textiles, clothing and footwear, where there have 
been massive job losses in Australia as tariffs have been cut to the advantage 
of imports from China.   
 
Colebatch (e.g. in The Age, 17 September 1997) has also pointed to OECD 
figures showing that Australia has suffered the largest decline in 
manufacturing output and employment of any Western nation in the 25 years 
since Australia’s program of particularly rapid tariff reduction commenced.   
 
Such evidence cannot be lightly written off as “popular mythology”. 
 
Tanner puts forward some good ideas about a more sophisticated industry 
policy role for governments in enhancing “quality, innovation…marketing and 
management skills” (p 111) and says that “industry policy should focus more 
on…factors…such as research and development” (p 108); however, he 
opposes tax concessions (p 110) and supports criticism of the former Labor 
government’s Research and Development tax concession.   
 
In a particularly obvious offering to the economic “rationalists” he also rejects 
the (AMWU-initiated) policy which the ALP took to the 1998 election to 
replace the notorious Productivity Commission with a new National 
Development Authority, in favour of keeping – and merely tinkering with – the 
existing Productivity Commission (p 112).   
 
In his tendency to set up a dichotomy between “old” and “new” jobs the 
substantial overlaps between the new information technology industries and 
what has conventionally been called “the manufacturing sector” are also lost 
sight of. 
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How to respond to Hanson 
 
At the very time in 1997 when leading ALP figures were supporting the efforts 
of the TCF unions and local municipal councils from areas employing large 
numbers of TCF workers such as Melbourne’s northern suburbs to stop 
further rapid tariff reduction – a campaign which succeeded in forcing the 
Howard government to reject the Productivity Commission’s preferred 
recommendation and freeze tariffs at their present levels until 2005, similar to 
what had earlier been achieved in the automotive industry – Tanner circulated 
a paper (“Populism and Rationalism”) suggesting that Labor’s focus on preserving 
these tariffs created “a serious risk that Labor will become prisoners of 
populist nostalgia such as that peddled by Pauline Hanson”. 
 
Also in that paper, Tanner declared that  
 
we must avoid becoming economically irrational, lapsing into mindless 
populism…If we adopt such a stance we will be virtually 
indistinguishable from Pauline Hanson on economic issues.  We 
should not delude ourselves that there is no link between her virulent 
racism and economic nostalgia.  The two are very closely related, and 
difficult to separate…[we want] new ideas and initiatives, not a trip 
down memory lane arm-in-arm with Pauline Hanson. (“Populism and 
Rationalism”, pages 1, 9.) 
 
Naturally people concerned about the job losses which would result from 
further rapid tariff reduction for TCF workers – many of whom were migrant 
women from non English-speaking backgrounds – objected to his outrageous 
suggestion that they were colluding with racists by seeking to protect those 
jobs.  Accordingly, the language is toned down a bit in the book, but the 
essential argument remains the same and remains wrong. 
 
A much better analysis of the relationship between Pauline Hanson’s 
economic and racial policies, and how to respond to them, has been put 
forward by Judith Brett who emphasises that, while in 1996: 
 
Labor did not convince blue-collar Australia of its cultural agenda of 
multiculturalism and racial tolerance …it has not convinced them of its 
economic agenda of deregulation, internationalisation and privatisation, 
either.  What they see is declining income, rising unemployment and an 
increasingly uncertain economic future.  This provides an opening for 
Labor to start to rebuild its support among working-class Australians 
without having to concede any cultural ground at all.  Economic policies 
clearly distinguished from Mr. Howard’s in giving a positive role to 
government in building industry and providing employment would 
quickly win back much of the support it lost. (Age, 11 October 1996.) 
 
In the 1998 election One Nation captured more than 8 per cent of the primary 
vote in the House of Representatives.  This surge of support for the new One 
Nation party, compared with the modest improvement in Labor’s own primary 
vote, confirms the strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the mainstream 
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political system and the policies which have been pursued by both major 
parties.  The ALP needs to better recognise this, and its deep and wide-
ranging causes, if that undercurrent is not to gather further momentum, and in 
particular the ALP needs to absorb the research evidence which is starting to 
emerge that support for One Nation is coming from blue-collar workers, 
people living on the fringes of urban areas, 
 
Mainly men over 50…and people with little or no tertiary education.  
Most of them have jobs but fear losing them.  In short they are the 
classic cast-offs of the new global economy – information-poor people 
who occupy none of the symbolic, transportable and uncommonly well-
paid professions such as law, high finance and various consultancies – 
and have little chance of ever catching up. (R. McGregor, “The Great Divide”, 
Weekend Australian, 4-5 July, 1998, reporting on the findings of Murray Goot, which 
are set out in detail in Goot’s Chapter, “Hanson’s Heartland: Who’s for One Nation 
and Why”, in R. Manne (ed.), Two Nations: The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the 
One Nation Party in Australia, Bookman, Melbourne, 1998, pp 51-74.  See also R. 
Davis and R. Stimson, “Disillusionment and Disenchantment at the Fringe: Explaining 
the Geography of the One Nation Party Vote at the Queensland Election”, People and 
Place, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1998, pp 69-82.) 
 
Tanner readily dismisses alternative views as “populism”.  This can very 
easily become an elitist label to tag other people’s different views.  When 
there is public support for something you disagree with, you call it “populist”; 
when there is public support for your own views, you call them democratic. 
 
At times he acknowledges that “our elite media appear to have little 
understanding of the causes of the Hanson phenomenon and little direct 
experience of the realities of life experienced by those who support her” (p 27) 
and correctly says that to see off the One Nation Party we need “coherent 
strategies for dealing with the economic problems which strengthen its 
support” (p 28).  Yet in the very same breath he himself dismisses the views 
of One Nation voters as “deeply irrational” (p 27) – rather than sufficiently 
acknowledging that Hanson is gaining support because the ALP really did 
move away from a focus on jobs and security in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
There is nothing irrational about people who have lost their jobs, and been 
unable to find new ones, protesting about the failure of the political parties 
they have traditionally supported to do more to alleviate their plight. 
 
Inconsistencies and imbalances 
 
This book shifts in style from narrow economic analysis and jargon (e.g. at p 
100 of the book it says that one of the main things to determine public 
ownership is “the externalities associated with production and consumption of 
the product”), to detailed prescriptions in particular portfolios, including 
education; communications and information technology (this section has one 
of the most solid and worthwhile sets of proposals although Tanner’s support 
for selling off further components of Telstra at p 179 will be highly contentious 
given the damage Labor’s equivocations on privatisation have already done to 
the ALP’s ideological coherence and ability to hold core supporters; 
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environmental issues (where Tanner maintains a position consistent with his 
long-standing record) to broader, more readable cultural diversions. 
 
Tanner says that “multiculturalism” was inaugurated in the 1980s and early 
1990s (p 20) when in fact it was officially inaugurated in 1973 following mass 
migration of people from non English-speaking backgrounds over the 
preceding decades.  The lack of a true historical perspective in his analysis 
more generally can be seen in statements such as “we are witnessing the 
gradual emergence of new Australia and the slow decline of old Australia.  
The Anglo Australia of factories and farms is giving way to a multicultural, 
cosmopolitan Australia of offices and cyberspace” (p 22).  In fact, people from 
non “Anglo” backgrounds have long been very disproportionately represented 
in the workforce of Australian factories.  Some things that have in fact been 
happening over decades are put together in Tanner’s analysis with newer 
developments and made to seem as if they are all happening just now, 
crowding in on us and irrevocably constraining our current political choices. 
 
He says that at the 1996 Federal election “Labor made the fatal mistake of 
campaigning as the architect of change” (p 20) thus alienating traditional 
supporters, but then advocates exactly the same kind of approach, to an even 
greater extent, in the future.   
 
He embraces the concept of “post-materialism” which was developed in the 
early 1970s to describe the phenomenon then of people increasingly voting 
according to issues beyond their immediate material well being (this having 
been largely satisfied) and says the concept now has “increasing importance” 
(p 79).  Arguably however this concept has been rendered out of date by the 
return of major material grievances – in particular the return of entrenched 
high unemployment – since the early 1970s, which is particularly hurting the 
kind of people from Labor’s traditional constituency some of whom are now 
(together with aggrieved former supporters of the National Party) registering a 
protest vote for the One Nation Party. 
 
The book describes lots of economic, social and cultural changes along much 
the same lines that earlier writers like Barry Jones in Australia and Robert 
Reich in the US have long been doing.   
 
We can agree absolutely with Tanner’s support for higher immigration to 
make Australia a stronger nation and to build a more sound long-term 
employment base, and there is much merit in many of his proposals for 
political reform, including of ALP internal structures.  We can agree with the 
focus on measures to boost demand in depressed regions and to promote 
labour intensive green jobs.  We can agree with his support for the proposed 
Tobin tax on international financial transactions; and his in principle view that 
“Australia should be a vigorous proponent of fair international regulation” (p 
115).   
 
We can also agree with his supporting the work that has been and is being 
done to broaden out the conventional measures of economic growth and 
progress beyond the narrow and misleading GDP.  But how about supporting 
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some broader measures closer to home when it is harder and counts for more 
– such as the way the Budget deficit is measured. The American economist 
Professor Robert Eisner for instance makes the point that the apparent size of 
a Budget deficit for a given financial year is, in its real economic effect, 
reduced greatly in size (and often turns out to be a surplus) once adjusted for 
the effect of inflation. There is a pressing need for more meaningful measures 
of national government expenditure which factor in the positive employment 
and other real economic outcomes of outlays, and the negative effects of 
Budget cuts on jobs and services. 
 
Instead, however, Tanner tends to use the need for international action as an 
excuse not to take action nationally – e.g. he states that  
 
The focus of economic debate has already shifted to the international 
level.  The current threat of deflation, and the need to reinflate much of 
the global economy, is being addressed internationally.  The larger 
economies are now so interdependent that unilateral national action is 
increasingly hazardous…Parties of the left should seize the opportunity 
to pursue an international regulatory agenda rather than lapsing into 
the nostalgia of national sovereignty politics.  As the capacity to modify 
market outcomes and restrain the power of capital at the national level 
gradually recedes, social democratic parties have no choice but to 
internationalise their efforts” (pages 116-117).   
 
They do however have a choice to do much more than just internationalise 
their efforts.  The need for greater international efforts should not be exclusive 
of more concerted regulatory, interventionist actions nationally and – crucially 
– at the local level as well, as John Wiseman indicates in the concluding 
chapters of his recent book (Global Nation?  Australia and the Politics of Globalisation, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
Tanner creates a totally unacceptable and grossly oversimplified choice 
between Paul Keating or Pauline Hanson (pages 38-39), which puts nearly 
the entire Left together with – or indeed even represented by – John Howard 
in the irrelevant middle.  He wrongly poses the central question today as 
being whether Australia is to be an open or closed society, when in fact the 
real question is what kind of open society Australia is to be.  There are no 
serious proposals to close Australia off from the rest of the world or to spurn 
outside ideas or influences, but there are still aspirations and good ideas 
about how to make Australia fairer, more equal and to tackle exploitation 
elsewhere, and there is a protest vote against the major parties’ failure to 
bring such concerns to the centre of their policy priorities.  The issue is how 
we shape, guide and strategically intervene to promote some kinds of positive 
change and discourage other, negative changes. 
 
Tanner asserts that the trends towards “increased income 
inequality…throughout the western world…were moderated significantly by 
the policies of the former Labor government” in Australia (p 69).  In some 
policy areas this is true – such as in social security where the introduction of 
the Family Allowance Supplement moderated rising market-driven income 
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inequality.  However in other areas of policy it is quite untrue: including many 
of the major macro-economic policies from 1983-90, and the shift to a 
radically more deregulated labour market in the last phase of the Keating 
government. 
 
The book jumps around a lot criticising other people’s attempts to deal with 
these difficult issues without itself offering a better alternative.  
 
Economic “rationalism” 
 
Tanner says that 
 
The facile notion that the Australian economy is a static entity in the 
process of being subjected to various ‘economic rationalist’ policies 
should be dispensed with.  The policies described as economic 
rationalism are essentially a response to these changes, not their 
cause.  They are occurring in various forms throughout the world, and 
in part are unavoidable (p 94). 
 
He takes the view that “whereas the Liberal Opposition was ideologically 
committed to economic rationalist policies, an essentially pragmatic Labor 
Government was driven to this position by overwhelming changes in the 
global economy” (endnote 81, p 227), thereby rejecting the work of others 
which has shown the extent to which that position was in fact taken largely as 
a result of the ideological capture of the senior public service (See M. Pusey, 
Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation Building State Changes its Mind, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) and the lack of developed Left alternative strategies. 
 
Tanner also ignores the significance of the fact that the neo-liberals were able 
to actually claim the mantle of economic “rationalism” with little effective 
opposition.  To describe a particular group as “rationalists” suggests that there 
is only one type of rationality, when in fact people can come to widely varying 
conclusions on the basis of equally rational arguments.  It also implies that 
opposing groups are irrational.   
 
Many neo-liberals who have styled themselves as economic “rationalists” do 
not really see it as irrational that officially nearly one tenth (and on broader 
measures one fifth) of the nation’s workforce are unable to contribute to its 
paid productive output.  Indeed many see it as a rational thing because it 
helps control wages and impose work discipline on those who do have jobs.  
Socialists on the other hand view such languishing of human resources and 
talents as fundamentally irrational as well as immoral. 
 
Tackling unemployment 
 
Tanner notes that “the future of mass employment lies largely in human 
services” and that “most of these services are delivered by the public sector 
which is struggling to keep pace with mounting demand” (p 127), without even 
acknowledging that the reason these public sector services are struggling to 
keep pace with mounting demand is that they have been cut to the bone by 
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governments, not because of technological change, but rather to gratify the 
overarching ideological quest for budgetary cuts.   
 
His response to the crisis in our hospitals, community service delivery 
agencies and under-resourced home and community care programs is not to 
restore adequate funding (which is also a key necessity in order to make 
serious inroads into unemployment) but rather just to say that “increased 
private involvement in the human services sector is probably inevitable, and 
may enhance its job-generating effects if a public framework of access and 
equity can be maintained”(p 127).   
 
In reality, there are many areas of human need which are not going to be 
adequately serviced by the private sector because they are not inherently 
profitable, and accordingly there has to be a commitment to deliver more 
services through the public sector both to meet the needs of our people, and 
to boost employment. 
 
Where to now? 
 
The ALP under Kim Beazley in its first phase of Opposition in 1996-98 built on 
and consolidated the partial movement back to some of Labor’s policy 
traditions which was taking place in some areas in the 1992-96 phase of the 
Labor government – placing emphasis on full employment as the paramount 
objective of economic policy, supporting greater public investment in health 
and education, picking up many of the Left’s positions on industry policy and 
also, significantly, returning to a strong commitment to centralised wage-
fixing.   
 
This approach, and Kim Beazley’s personal embodiment of a more humane 
and caring Labor style than Paul Keating, aided the ALP’s recovery of some 
support at the 1998 election following the heavy defeat in 1996.  Tanner 
however appears to be fundamentally uncomfortable with this approach, 
rebuking it as “populist” and preferring to go back to much the same agenda 
which Labor adopted in government in the 1980s and early 1990s.   
 
More generally, a view seems to have taken hold in various quarters in 
Canberra since the 1998 election that, having had a brief dalliance with 
Labor’s core supporters and their concerns since 1996, it is now time to get 
back to the serious business of implementing the neo-liberal agenda and 
giving the people what is good for them – whether they like it or not.  If this 
attitude is allowed to prevail it will create very serious setbacks to the 
progress Labor has made since 1996, and substantially lengthen our likely 
time in Opposition. 
 
What the ALP should now do is develop further, more thoroughly, more 
credibly and more innovatively in the direction it was taking from 1996-98 in its 
next phase, and not revert to the 1980s policies, if it is to continue to rebuild 
support and create the kind of open Australia that many in the Left have 
always striven for: one of fairness, equality, decent public services and 
resources and the fullest possible employment.  
